BETWEEN
FOUR WORLDS: CHINA, RUSSIA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA;
BETWEEN FOUR CAREERS: DIPLOMAT, ECONOMIST, JOURNALIST AND
JAPANOLOGIST;
BETWEEN
FOUR LANGUAGES: ENGLISH, CHINESE, RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE
Chapter
16
RETAILING THE ‘TRIBE’ THEORY.
1. PUBLICATION PROBLEMS
2. THE ‘TRIBE’ THEORY EVOLVES FURTHER
3. EXPLAINING THE JAPANESE TO THEMSELVES, ON THE LECTURE
CIRCUIT.
4. TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WORLD
1.
PUBLICATION PROBLEMS
From the moment the Japanese version of “The Japanese
Tribe” book emerged back in 1978, I was being asked
when the English language original would appear.
Simul had promised to publish it as soon as they had the
Japanese version out. But then came that rather silly
dispute with Muramatsu of Simul over royalty payments.
Japanese publishers like to pay a fixed rate regardless of
sales volume. I felt the rate should fluctuate with sales
volumes. At the time I did not understand properly the
rationale behind the Japanese approach.
Simul being out of the picture did not worry me greatly.
Some foreign publishers – Charles Tuttle of Tuttle
Publishing in particular – were showing interest in
the English original.
I would have liked to have said yes. And maybe I should
have said yes. Tuttle were good publishers.
But there were problems, and not just the usual
writer’s tristesse.
REALITIES
CREEP IN
One was realizing that in trying to describe the Japanese
value system I had been dabbling in dangerous academic
waters. The sociologists themselves had not come up with
the terms and concepts needed to describe a nation like
Japan.
And I was no sociologist.
I also needed something better to explain Japan’s
economic ‘miracle,’ a topic that was daily
becoming more important.
I realized too that I was not simply writing about the
Japanese. In trying to compare them to other peoples I was
in effect trying to write about the entire human race
– a topic for which I was, and remain, somewhat less
than fully qualified.
Most of all, I was getting to be very busy on the lecture
circuit. That helped me to clarify a lot of my ideas about
Japan; as mentioned earlier, it made me realize that Japan
was even more ‘tribal’ than I had thought.
But it also cut into the time I could write about those
ideas.
My files are filled with drafts dashed off in moments of
zeal after some speech or conference which had given me
some new insight, and then allowed to languish as I headed
off to the next assignment.
BOUQUETS,
AND BRICKBATS
Meanwhile the reaction to the book was building up.
Most of the main Japanese papers and magazines gave it good
reviews – though good reviews have little meaning in
Japan since it is rare to find a bad review.
But there seemed to be a genuine interest in the fact that
a foreigner who knew China and had some Japanese background
was trying to explain Japan. In those days I had few
competitors.
Indeed, there are still few Westerners who can do the
China-Japan comparison properly.
There was also interest from US and European businessmen.
They assumed, probably mistakenly, that anyone willing to
write about the Japanese and get published in Japan must
know something about how to do business in Japan.
I did not try to disabuse them, partly because it helped me
get to know something about how they did business in Japan.
The World Economic Forum people also latched on to me for a
while. After being dragged to a few of their rather vacuous
conferences around Asia we lost interest in each other.
(The ability of that outfit to convince the world that it
has some handle on global events is further proof of
Western media herd instinct. That top business leaders pay
large amounts to attend its meetings is also proof perfect
of the vanity and vacuity in big business.)
ANTI-NIHONJINRON
But the foreign academic community was largely hostile.
Part of it was standard academic jealousy.
But many also saw me as playing up to the Japanese
nationalistic desire to see themselves as unique (almost
all of them were judging from the title of my book; I have
yet to meet one who has actually read the book.)
I was to be victim of their knee-jerk reaction against
Nihonjin-ron.
Curiously, in their books and articles pouring scorn on
anyone, and not just myself, who tries to develop a theory,
to explain Japan*, they usually then go on to give us their
version of how to explain Japan.
In other words, their Nihonjin-ron is right, and everyone
else is wrong.
One of the more notorious was a European journalist (yet
another non-Japanese speaker) who having completed the
ritual denigration of anyone who saw Japan as in any way
unusual, then went on to tell us about some sinister System
which could explain the alleged ‘enigma’ of
Japan.
I realized I had to firm up my ideas about Japan.
*(In a turgid tract published by an American at
Australia’s Monash university, mine and others’
statements about the obvious fact that the Japanese were
groupist were pooh-poohed at length.
(It was claimed that at heart the Japanese were sturdy
individualists like the rest of us, or even more so.
(The popularity of single contestant sports like sumo or
golf, as opposed to the team sports like cricket or rugby
that we non-Japanese craved **, was supposed to be proof..
(Said expert did not seem to know how each sumo contestant
is tied in groupist, feudalistic bondage to one or other of
the officially recognized stables. Nor did he know that
most golfers belong to a gundan – literally, an army
– centered on some older and once famous player.)
Amazingly, this anti-Nihonjinron nonsense finds great
approval among many foreign academics involved with Japan.
The highly non-academic determination to reject any idea
that conflicts with their dogma about Japan runs deep.)
**(The popularity of team sports, especially amongst us
Anglo-Saxons, could be because of the ease with which it
give us an outlet for our own ‘locational’
group instincts.
(Japanese caught up in groupist rituals almost from birth
have less need for such outlets. Whatever sport they
indulge in almost always will have some groupist mould
imposed on it.)
FEUDALISM
AND THE CURVE OF PROGRESS
Gradually the ideas did begin to firm up.
A major breakthrough was the curve of progress described in
the previous chapter.
But should I publish it somewhere? Or should I wait till I
could present it in book form?
The curve seemed to have two important implications –
one, that in terms of values the Japanese were much closer
to us peoples of north European culture than they were to
the Chinese or other older civilization peoples, and two
that full feudalism could well have been the prerequisite
for the autonomous industrial progress and the civil
society found in Japan and North Europe,
What would I do if some bright academic were to run off
with all this and publish it as his own idea?
But I need not have worried.
A few Western academics at the time were playing with the
idea that full feudalism was the key to the growth of the
civil society/social-contract democracy in north Europe.
But they had not realized it could also be the basis of
industrial growth.
(Historians usually are not very interested in economics.)
Reischauer had written about the similarities between
German and Japanese feudalism, but as he admitted in later
life he should have, but had not, followed up on the idea
in a broader context.
It seemed as if I had the field to myself.
My first move was to have the curve inserted as appendix to
the 1979 “Yuunikyu na Nihonjin” book, knowing
that few Western academics would get even to look at the
book let alone the appendix
With some trepidation I also put it into a slim 1983
English-language reader book for Japanese students
“Understanding the Japanese.”
But the reaction was muted.
I decided I had plenty of time to get my ideas into proper
print.
I was challenging the conventional wisdoms, not just about
Japan but also about the bases for economic and social
progress. Few others would want to follow me in a hurry.
Besides, I had more pressing things to do – mainly
trying to raise a family, and to reconcile my university
teaching duties with the ever-increasing demands of the
lecture circuit.
JAPAN,
AND THE MIDDLE OF HISTORY
A turning point for me was the early 90’s debate over
the alleged collapse of communism. This was supposed to
represent the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy over
communist evil.
In fact, the emergence of Gorbachev marked the triumph of
reasonably idealistic, i.e. good, progressive, communism
over corrupt bureaucratic communism, as I had discovered
more than twenty years earlier in the Moscow student cafes.
(That an intelligent humanitarian of Gorbachev’s
quality could emerge as leader in the Soviet Union while
the best the US could produce was a bumbling, militaristic
ignoramus like Ronald Reagan also said a lot about the
superiority of the post-Brezhnev political process in the
Soviet Union over the corruption and theatricalism of US
politics.
(Gorbachev’s downfall began with the failed coup by
conservative communist ideologues – people from
exactly the same ideological mould (love of nation and
flag; dislike of free speech, libertarianism and
pornography; the need for firm ideology* ) as Ronald
Reagan.
(This was followed by the rise of an opportunistic and
corrupt ex-communist called Yeltsin, who was welcomed by
the West. Somehow he was supposed to represent the victory
of democracy over communism.
But what really stirred me was the sight of the US
academic, Francis Fukuyama, propagating a thesis about
liberal democracy being the ultimate stage in human
development – the end of history.
My own experience of politics, plus my curve of progress,
had told me something very different – that the
consensual, social-contract democracy in the West was a
very fragile and temporary thing.
It relied on post-feudal communalistic pressures for people
to behave honestly and fairly as part of a larger
cooperative called the nation – the so-called civil
society or social contract.
It was highly vulnerable to the rationalistic pressures
that said why. Why be civil and cooperative when the power
needed to control the nation, and its various sub-units,
could be so easily bought, manipulated or imposed?
There was no need to rely on honesty and integrity to get
to the top. The smart operators and petty dictators knew a
much easier way.
(Already in Canberra I had seen close up the collapse of
Australia’s former and attractive social-contract
democracy, and the rise of Australia’s now-dominant
power-at-all-costs, winner-takes-all
‘democracy.’
(The social contract? What’s that, mate?)
The same rationalistic pressures were also working to force
the breakdown of the former and attractive instinctual
morality – the sense of order, honesty, consideration
etc that develops naturally in any communal society.
Thinking rationalistically, why should I abstain from
shop-lifting for example if society has no effective way to
punish me for shop-lifting?
The society and the shop-keeper may lose. But rationalistic
I gain. In this situation the social contract is helpless.
Systems of harsh laws, fire and brimstone religions and
draconian punishments are needed. Consensual pressures are
not enough.
Already we were seeing this in the West, with the US as an
especially good example. Increasingly it had begun to rely
on legalism, ideological nationalism and fundamentalist
religions to hold itself together .
Its politics had degenerated into
‘power-at-all-costs’ democracy.
The conclusion seemed obvious: Far from being the end of
history, our liberal democracy was in fact an intermediate
stage between the communalistic feudal society and the
authoritarian and ideological societies of the older
civilizations.
The end of history was in fact the middle of history, with
a very short lifespan and with a very predictable ending*
If anything, Japan was closer to the ‘middle of
history’ ideal than many of our Western democracies
already under threat and having to rely on tight legal
systems or chauvinistic nationalism to hold themselves
together, and fundamentalist religions to give their
citizens a sense of meaning and security.
(We Westerners like to think we are free from ideological
hangups. One of my larger shocks was returning from Moscow,
turning on my radio on a Sunday morning and having to
listen to hours of religious outpourings.
(Even the more secular amongst us are conditioned to see
these outpourings as mere foibles, or hangovers from the
past. But when you come back to them from years in a
communist society you can see them for what they are -
sociological props every bit as nonsensical as the
‘long live Soviet communism’ dogma on the
Moscow media.
(Since then we have seen those outpourings harden into
evangelistical dogma.
But Japan too would have only a brief time at the top.
Already the rationalistic ‘why’ factor was
coming to play. Why be honest when being dishonest promises
gain with little risk of detection. And in Japan, even if
detected, there is little risk of punishment for petty
crimes like shop-lifting.
The growth of shop-lifting in areas where youth are major
customers for me marks a watershed in Japan’s
communalistic morality.
One watches on with immense sympathy as shop-owners
initially try to tolerate the situation and then resort to
placards begging people to behave properly. But eventually
they will have to resort to the harsh measures used in the
West.
Increased job-hopping is another rationalistic phenomenon
(why be loyal to one employer all one’s working life
when one can benefit oneself by changing jobs? ).
True in small groups the communalist ethic remains strong.
But only in the small group. In the large group, especially
the one called the society, it is breaking down. Offensive
bike gangs (boszoku) impervious to any sense of shame or
guilt for the nuisances they are creating for the society
are the advance warnings.
* However if Gorbachev communism had been allowed to evolve
naturally we might have seen a very interesting alternative
to the religious or nationalistic ideologies now being used
to hold Russia together.
WHAT TO
DO?
Getting to see the flaws in the end of history theory was
one thing. More worrying was realizing how the Fukuyama
thesis would be used to justify even more attempts by the
US to boost its national ego and justify its global
hegemonism.
In short, I had to do something quickly. But if I wanted to
explain my ‘middle of history’ thesis I would
have to explain Japan.
And if I was to explain Japan I would have to write about
it.
FIRST
EFFORTS
But how? If was to write, it would have to be in article
form. I did not have the time to write a book. Could an
brief article explain things in a form that readers would
understand?
After some futile efforts to summarize the entire theory in
2000-3000 word pieces and get it published I gave up.
True, Foreign Affairs at least gave me the courtesy of a
considered reply. Which they should have done, since they
had done so much to launch the Fukuyama thesis.
But most of the other journals of alleged Western
intellectual opinion were uninterested.
Only in the Japan Times, increasingly my journalistic
sponsor in Japan, did I get some space. But there was
little or no follow up.
As with my China and Vietnam anguish of the sixties, I was
being forced once again to discover how hard it is to
battle the conventional wisdom.
On the lecture circuit in Japan I would get good audiences,
pointing out Japan’s similarities with North Europe
and the differences with China. One or two intellectuals
– Yamamoto Shichihei of “Japanese and the
Jews” fame especially – also showed interest.
Yamamoto with his theory about how Japanese were dominated
by the kuki – the emotional atmosphere surrounding
people and events - fitted in neatly with my views about
Japan’s mood-based emotionalism (though most of his
other theories did not make much sense).
But the best audiences were the overseas Chinese in
Hongkong and Singapore. They, more than most, could realize
there was something unusual about the Japanese, and were
keen to know what it was.
That, together with some major improvements in the
‘tribe’ theory, did much to encourage me to
start serious writing, even if belatedly. In particular, I
was keen to present the symmetries I was developing.
SECTION
TWO: THE ‘TRIBE’ THEORY EVOLVES
THE
SYMMETRIES
Symmetry and consistency in the empirical data help greatly
to confirm deductive theories, and not just in the
sciences.
The symmetry in the curve of progress was one example. I
was beginning to discover others.
One of the first I mentioned earlier. This was realising
that Japan’s puzzling contradiction between
exclusivism towards foreign people and openness to foreign
culture was matched mirror image by our non-Japanese
exclusivism at the level of culture and relative openness
at the level of people.
And the reasons could be related easily back to my original
‘tribe’ theory.
To recapitulate, we are all like the Japanese at the small
group level. In our families we would hardly be upset if
our children spoke a foreign language. But we would be
upset if friends or anyone else insisted they should be
regarded as members of our family.
(And if for some reason we want to adopt outsiders into our
family, we insist they integrate totally. Japan’s
formerly tough standards for acquiring Japanese nationality
– including having to change one’s name - was
an ‘adoption’ approach to nationality.
( Japan’s draconian integration policies in its
former colonies – the demands that the foreigners
speak Japanese, worship the emperor and even have Japanese
names – were part of the same familial syndrome. *
In short, in our natural state - i.e. in small group
situations - we all see group identity at the level of
people rather than culture. To preserve that identity, we
are all more exclusive at the level of people rather than
culture.
(The classic example is the cargo cult of the Papua New
Guinea tribespeople. We can be fairly sure they would not
welcome outsiders as members. But they will wait for days
on the tops of mountain tops for the promised silver plane
which will bring them cultural ‘cargo’ from the
outside world.)
The Japanese continue to do just the same at the national
level – exclude foreign people rather than foreign
culture. Indeed their hunger for foreign culture has cargo
cult aspects .
But for us non-Japanese the nation is a group held together
by the attribute of shared culture-ideology. So we are all
more exclusivist at that cultural-ideological level than at
the level of people.
Earlier I mentioned the French as a good example. They have
a strong cultural identity. They are confident ( or at
least they were until recently) that their superior culture
would allow them to absorb foreigners easily. But they are
afraid that if a few English words enter their language it
will subvert their culture, and therefore their national
identity.
The Japanese are the mirror-image opposite.They seem able
to absorb any amount of English vocabulary, foreign ideas,
etc. But they are reluctant to bring in foreigners, even
when it is clear that foreign labor is needed *
To us the Japanese familial approach to nationhood seems
abnormal. But the Japanese could say the same about our
more rationalistic approach – especially now that it
is clear that some Western nations, believing proudly in
the ability of their culture/ideology to absorb foreigners,
are finding otherwise.
The neat symmetry of this openness/exclusivist syndrome
excited me greatly. But when I tried to put it down on
paper in response to a request from the Japan Society of
the US for an article for their house magazine back in 1978
I got a very negative response ( from an editor called Ruri
Kawashima, I recall, and the daughter of the man who at
Sophia had helped me gain my professorship there.)
They, like most other Japan-watchers, preferred to go along
with the conventional wisdom that sees the Western approach
as ‘normal’ and the Japanese approach as
abnormal at best and racist at worst.
I was forced to realize once again that things that were
becoming obvious to me were not going to be so obvious to
others.
The pressure on me to get my ideas into order, and then
into book form, was even greater.
* (Some see the forceful and shameful pressure on the Ainu
and other distinct cultural groups in Japan such as the
Okinawans to abandon their culture and become proper
Nihonjin as proof of a powerful cultural arrogance. But in
that case why do those allegedly culturally-proud Nihonjin
tolerate the flood of foreignisms into their culture?
(Once again we see the familial approach to national
identity at work, this time in a rather unattractive
manner.
(People with a strong cultural or ideological identity do
not have to behave this way. The Chinese are quite happy,
proud even, to admit to different cultures within the bosom
of the dominant Han civilization. Like the French, they
feel this cultural tolerance helps to prove the cultural
worth of their own civilization, and that the minorities
will come of their own accord to appreciate the worth of
Han civilization anyway.
(Ideological societies – Islam, the former Soviet
Union – also tolerate different cultures, in the
belief that the binding ‘culture’ i.e. the
ideology will be dominant anyway.
THE
INSTINCTIVE/RATIONALISTIC SYMMETRY
Another exciting symmetry was the concept of rational
instinctive versus irrational instinctive, and rational
rationalistic versus irrational rationalistic (see previous
chapter for a fuller description).
In other words, the rational, practical logic of the
Japanese had its equivalent in the more scientific or
intellectual logic of the non-Japanese world.
The irrational emotionalism of the Japanese (booms, moods
etc) had its equivalent the irrational dogmatism of the
non-Japanese world - our propensities to religious fervor,
political (e.g.anti-communist) hysteria, Cultural
Revolution chaos and so on.
THE
SINGLE VARIABLE – PRINCIPLE VERSUS NON-PRINCIPLE
Playing around with this rational versus irrational matrix
I realized I could reduce everything to a single variable -
the propensity or otherwise to rely on, or not to rely on,
principle.
So if we add principles – good principles - to
rational practicality we end up with
scientific/intellectual logic. (Good scientists agree that
close observation and experiment is the basis of most
breakthroughs in scientific theory.)
Add principles – bad principles - to irrational
emotionalism and we end up with the irrational dogmatism of
the Cold War, the Cultural Revolution, or any of the other
mad orthodoxies that have racked our civilizations .
The ideal situation for economic progress was the
combination of rational practicality with rational
scientific/intellectual logic. It described well the
impressive industrial progress of Japan and North Europe.
It coincided with the apex my curve of progress.
Conversely, the worst of all worlds was irrational
instincts combined with irrational ideologies – as we
have seen in the brutality of wars and conflicts imposed by
both Japan and the north European peoples. For
international affairs it was the worst possible situation
– particularly since the peoples endowed with
irrational militaristic instincts also had the industrial
might to allow them to indulge those instincts.
Being able to reduce everything down to a single variable
– the attachment or otherwise to principles –
meant I could relate everything directly back to my
original theory as to the origins of Japanese/non-Japanese
differences, namely development in isolation rather than in
non-isolated, mainly continental peoples as the basis for
the development of value systems based on instinctual
feelings rather than rationalistic principles.
In short, I felt I had my ‘general theory’ to
explain not just Japan’s development but also that of
other societies. I was ready to publish something. But the
lecture circuit intervened, again. And while it was time
consuming, it did allow me to develop techniques to explain
the theory, and its practical applications, more simply.
SECTION
THREE: EXPLAINING THE JAPANESE TO THEMSELVES ON THE LECTURE
CIRCUIT.
RIGHT
HAND/LEFT HAND
As the lecture circuit ground on I realized it would help a
lot if I used the Japanese terminology – kansei
(instinctive, feeling, emotional), as opposed to risei
– (principled, reasoned, argued).
This was much easier to explain than the meanings of
instinctual versus rationalistic.
I could also simplify everything with a right hand versus
left hand analogy.
(Waving my hands around also made it easy to relate to
audiences.)
Just as most of us also begin life with a bias towards
using the right hand, as humans, I would say, we all
naturally begin life with a bias towards kansei - towards
the instinctual, communalistic approach.
The Japanese for reasons of history stayed with the bias.
Meanwhile most of the rest of us – the older
continental civilizations especially – moved away
from using the right hand and relying more on the left
hand.
True, in our small groups we all retained and used that
right hand, for the simple reason that it was natural to
us. .
But when we non-Japanese move to create large groups
– a society or nation for example - we feel the need
to operate with the left hand i.e. on the basis of
rationalistic principles. .
Meanwhile the Japanese had been able to refine their right
hand approach and use it to organize larger groups such as
the enterprise, the university, the society and the nation.
Management of the Japanese enterprise was
‘right-handed’ familial-style management. So
too was university management – something with which
I was becoming very familiar.
True, as groups grew larger, established rules were needed
to replace more purely instinctual rules of the smaller
group. In the case of Japan, those rules were simply a
refined version of the human relations rules that develop
naturally in any small group - haji, giri-ninjo, tatemae
and honne etc. They needed no formal, ideological backup,
other than the strictures of bushido .
But with the rest of us the rules did need the backup of
rationalistic religion, law, ideology, conscience, logic.
So the instinctual rules became reasoned, including
religious, principles.
Nor was there anything wrong in moving to a more
‘left-handed’ approach. The techniques we used
to hold our societies and nations together - principles,
ideologies, laws etc - we often as good if not better than
the techniques the Japanese used.
We had the advantage of a more top-down approach to
government; on balance that was preferable to Japan’s
more cellular approach with ministries and pressure groups
competing to decide policies.
On balance that top-down approach was probably also more
useful than the consensus approach in other larger social
units - enterprises, universities etc. (as I had discovered
earlier in Japan’s university system , where endless
debates and arguments in the kyojukai – professorial
committee – often blocked effective decision making.)
Our non-Japanese shift to rationalistic thinking also
explained our scientific achievement.
But even at the level of society there were merits in the
Japanese approach – the attention to detail,
monozukuri and other technical skills, weakness of dogmatic
religions etc.
The ultimate ideal was some combination of the merits of
both approaches – the merits of the practical, human
relations approach of the Japanese, and the more reasoned,
principled approach of us non-Japanese.
(For effect I would hold up the cup of water usually placed
in front of me to show that it could be held just as well
by the left hand as by the right hand.)
(But the best and firmest way to hold the cup would be the
combination of both the right and the left hands.
The Japanese had been quite successful in doing that in the
past. They had begun with the right-hand approach of their
original clan or village society. Some 1500 years ago they
had begun to introduce the rationalistic products of the
Chinese civilization– the systems of bureaucracy,
economy, central government etc of the Ritsuryo period.
Then beginning 500 years ago they had begun to introduce
the rationalistic products of Western civilization.
They had combined both right hand with left hand and had
come close to the ideal, even if their natural bias
remained towards using the right hand and at times there
were confusions.
We non-Japanese sometimes tended too much to assume that
the ‘left-handed’ approach was superior and to
rely on it too much to solve problems. One result was our
obsession with religious and other dogmatic ideologies.
Another was a propensity for using the law to decide
disputes, and the infestation of lawyers and law suits.
(Japan too has many law suits. But they are mostly
technical - debt and gangster related. The true proof of
litigiousness is willingness of customers to sue the firms
and doctors that serve them. Here Japan comes well down in
the list.)
By comparison, the Japanese system of court-supervised
mediation before disputes are brought before the courts,
for example, was good instance to combining the two
approaches.
True, there were times when trying to combine the two
approaches also caused problems. The same courts were an
example since they still tended to decide disputes on a
50-50 basis (a right-handed approach) rather than try to do
what they were supposed to do, namely to determine rights
and wrongs objectively.
Diplomacy was another area where the left-handed approach
of reasoned debate and argued principles was clearly
needed, and where the Japanese, not surprisingly, were
weak.
Enterprise management was an area where arguably the
right-handed approach was superior, though it could be
improved even further by bringing in some left-handed
elements – merit promotion, greater labor mobility
etc.
For there I would move on to the question of China.
The older civilizations, I would argue, had moved much too
far to the ‘left’ with much too much emphasis
on ideology and other principles (preference for
bureaucracy and scholarship rather than hands-on
manufacturing) to organize themselves.
But this was now changing rapidly. The combination of smart
businessmen, an entrepreneurial and work ethic focused on
gaining income for oneself and relatives, foreign
investment, access to technology, cheap labor and a large
domestic market would turn China into a formidable
competitor. Yuan upvaluation was badly needed ( as I wrote
in Japan Times article back in 2003).
India too was advancing on the same basis. It lacked the
secular bias of the Chinese so its growth might be slower.
Its talents would find more outlet in intellectual IT
rather than hands-on manufacturing.
All in all it made for a neat, simple and symmetrical
explanation of Japanese/non- Japanese differences.
The Japanese liked it because it was ‘wakari-yasui
(easily understood, and a term also used constantly to
praise simplistic books and politicians).
(This liking for the wakari-yasui is one reason why Japan
was and remains weak to fascistic demagogues.
(But I should not complain. It also helped all this
particular demagogue have a golden run on the Japanese
lecture circuit for more than twenty years.)
INTERNATIONALISATION
Meanwhile the requests to give lectures were continuing to
pour in - at the rate of three-four a week, despite the
fact I was not using any agent to promote myself.
Somehow and for some reason the word had got round that I
could keep an audience amused, educated or awake for the
standard 90 minutes.
I was too enthused by the challenge and experience (and the
money too, to be honest) to so no.
Meanwhile I was also trying to organize an increasingly
complex daily life – university commitments, two
young children requiring bilingual education, a new house,
building plans etc.,
The internationalization (kokusaika) boom of the
mid-eighties saw me get even busier.
Japan’s trade and other frictions with the outside
world were mounting. The foreigners blamed it on Japanese
cunning and duplicity.
The Japanese blamed it on their believed lack of kokusaika
– on their inability to understand how we foreigners
thought and operated. Suddenly I was in even more demand
than before as a lecturer.
(In fact the trade frictions were due to a simple economic
problem – Japan’s capacity to produce more than
it could consume, an imbalance that continues to plague
this economy.
(They were worsened by Tokyo’s inability to present
its case logically.)
Here the right hand versus left hand analogy was useful in
explaining the various misunderstandings.
I would say how both hands alone could perform the same
operation quite well, e.g. raising the glass of water. But
if one looked closely it was clear that even though the
hands were doing the same thing, they were facing in
opposite directions.
That in essence was Japan’s problems with the outside
world. It was trying to tackle much the same problems as us
non-Japanese - develop its economy, find trade partners,
organize its diplomacy, etc.. But when it used the right
hand rather than the left hand – kansei rather than
risei - to do these things, it often seemed to be doing
things 180 degrees back to front.
What seems normal to the right-hander seems abnormal to the
left hander, and vice versa.
This slotted in neatly to a favorite Japanese saying,
namely that Japan’s joshiki (commonsense ) was the
foreigner’s hijoshiki ( non-commonsense), and the
foreigner’s joshiki was Japan’s hi-joshiki.
What to do? One answer would be for the Japanese to try to
become left-handed, I would say. But that was not easy.
The only other way out was for both sides to accept that
there were merits, and demerits, in both approaches.
CONTRADICTIONS
From here it was a small jump to pointing out that a
problem for most of us Japan-watchers was explaining
Japan’s many seeming contradictions – kind and
selfish, gentle and cruel, harmonious and conflicting etc
etc.
Here the concept of Japanese operating more in a kansei
dimension, while we non-Japanese operated in a more risei
dimension helped greatly.
As mentioned earlier, as human beings we all have the
ability to operate in either dimension – the
instinctual and the rationalistic (or the kansei and the
risei).
And as human beings we all have the same desires, wants,
phobias etc. We all seek or are prone to love, happiness,
harmony, aggression, hatreds, group relations etc.
But while we all have the same goals as human beings, there
is a crucial difference in the way we try to realize those
goals. The difference is not so much one of ability. Rather
it is one of propensity.
So it is not a matter of the Japanese or us non-Japanese
being more harmonious or non-harmonious, more groupist or
non-groupist, crueller or kinder, more progressive or more
conservative, more moral or immoral, more racist or
humanitarian etc than the other.
What differs is the dimension – instinctual or
rationalistic, kansei or risei – in which we seek to
do these things.
When the Japanese were trying to be harmonious in the
kansei dimension, the result could by a very impressive
harmony. Seeing that, some could conclude that the Japanese
were a uniquely harmonious people.
But when they wanted to argue and conflict with each other,
that too would be in the kansei dimension. The result would
be an impressively emotional disharmony.
The Japanese being kind to others in the kansei dimension
would lead some to conclude that objectively they were one
of the kindest nations in the world - for example in their
honesty or their willingness to guide foreigners to
destinations or return lost property.
But their cruelty to others in the kansei dimension could
make them seem like one of the most barbaric of peoples
-for example, their wartime atrocities fuelled by total
hatred, cruelty and contempt for people arbitrarily dubbed
as enemies
Conversely, the harmony or disharmony, or the kindness or
cruelty of us non-Japanese operating in the more risei
dimension could also produce seeming extremes of behavior.
EXPLAINING
VALUE DIFFERENCES
From there it was yet another small step to explaining
value differences - the shame versus guilt factor, for
example.
All societies had to impose restraints and punishments on
wrong-doing. But in a communalistic society like Japan (and
as in tribal societies) , it was natural to rely on shame
– to insist that the wrong-doers had shamed
themselves before other members of the society and should
be punished by being made to bow their heads in apology,
excluded from the society, or being disgraced in some other
manner.
(During our feudal era we northern European peoples also
relied on shame - putting people in the stocks was a good
example. Feudal Japan had the same device.)
Meanwhile in more rationalistic societies, wrong-doers
would be found guilty of having violated some principle of
law. They would be punished accordingly - go to jail or be
fined.
DIPLOMACY
AND ECONOMICS
A major benefit of using the righthand-lefthand analogy was
in explaining Japan’s poor diplomacy. So where the
Japanese used feelings and practical details to try to
resolve issues, we non-Japanese would rely more on
argument, principles and theories.
I would often follow this up with a detailed outline of how
Japan had wrecked its quite good case over the Kurile
Islands dispute with Moscow by relying too much on
distorted logic and sneaky attempts to deny facts.
Instead it preferred to speak endlessly about kokumin kanjo
(national feeling or emotion), as if emotion was supposed
to have superiority over dry logic and facts.
(Surprisingly, the audiences would often nod in agreement
to my foreign policy criticisms. Many are conditioned to
believe that Japan is weak in this area.
(The only bad reaction I received was trying to explain
North Korea’s penchant for abducting Japanese
citizens in the past and the possibly not returning some of
them. Here audiences literally bristled. The human factor
in this dispute seemed dominant.)
I would then move to point out the flip side of this
reliance on kanjo. Under emotional pressures such as
gaiatsu the same Japanese would back down from positions
even when it was clear that the principles of international
law or diplomacy were in the their favor – the car
dispute with the US for example.
Here a good analogy in golf-crazy Japan was that of a
right-handed golfer trying to use left-handed clubs.
The rules of diplomacy had been laid down over they years
by us left-handers. But the Japanese preferred
right-handled clubs, and when forced to use left-handled
clubs they naturally enough were not very competent.
For Japanese brought up to believe their nation’s
diplomacy was inferior, it was a neat explanation.
Even the economy could be explained in ways an audience
could understand.
Despite the occasional emotional spending binges of the
Japanese, the economy suffered chronically from excessive
savings and a chronic lack of domestic demand since the
1970’s (see my many articles pointing out the mistake
of supply-oriented economic policies in this situation). .
The savings excess was partly due to irrational fears about
the future. But the main factor was people seeing their
identity in terms of ba or location (which usually required
limited expenditure) rather than attribute which, in the
Anglosaxon societies especially, often required much
conspicuous spending to acquire attribute status symbols
– large houses, second houses, swimming pools, yachts
etc.
These big ticket, lifestyle items were crucial to
sustaining demand in advanced economies where people had
already fulfilled most of their basic demands. The relative
absence of demand for these items in Japan caused a serious
demand/supply imbalance in the economy generally.
Once again I was getting the wakari-yasui response
What’s more this was an explanation that did not make
Japan look silly. Audiences liked that. And so did I, since
it was a breakthrough in economic thinking of which I was
quite proud.
But writings for foreign audiences on this theme met little
response. The conventional wisdom about advanced economies
said that demand was unlimited and that the main problem
was coping with inflation and increasing supply.
Eventually the foreigners were to succeed in imposing this
view on Japan, helping largely to cause the two ugly and
dangerous recessions of the 1995-2005 period
The idea that Japan’s advanced economy could be
fundamentally different from other advanced economies ran
into the same problems as I had had with the
anti-Nihonjinron people.
And in both cases the root cause was an inability to
understand Japan’s very unusual value system.
SECTION
FOUR: TRYING TO CONVINCE THE WORLD
Taken together – values, contradictions, enterprise
management, diplomacy, economy etc. - I felt sure I had a
solid explanation, not just of Japan but also of the rest
of us. But could I convince others of all this?
A close friend, the Sydney Morning Herald correspondent in
Tokyo, John Slee, was good enough to write a long feature
outlining the entire theory.
John had earlier introduced me to the Dr. Tusnoda Tadanobu
experiments showing right-left hemisphere differences
between Japanese and non-Japanese (including Japanese
brought up abroad). Both of us realized how this could be
related to my instinctual versus rationalistic analysis.
Tsunoda’s problem was in explaining the difference.
I could, by saying that those brought up in an emotional,
instinctual environment (the right hemisphere) would tend
to want to develop connections with the more reasoning,
left hemisphere.
The rest of us, would make clearer distinctions between the
two.
But John’s foreign editor was a woman journalist,
Margaret Smith, with whom I had had a minor run-in in
Beijing a few years earlier (she was rather anti-China).
She killed his feature.
Clearly both of us were having problems convincing the
world.
Later I was to realize the parallels between
Tsunoda’s Japan versus non-Japanese brain differences
with developing research on male-female brain differences,
with the Japanese matching the female pattern. Not only did
this fit in with the claims that Japanese values and
culture had feminine features. It also suggested the
possibility that the male-female difference too was more
the result of imposed environment than nature also emerged.
But a lot of this speculation depended on others following
up on Tsunoda’s research, which did not happen. And
as ever, on the one accasion I tried to write it up I met
the usual deluge of abuse and distain from the
anti-Nihonjin-ron crowd, even though many of them as
save-the-world-all humans are-equal believers were also in
the business of claiming that female qualities were more
the result of nuture rather than nature – just as I
was suggesting as a possibility
GETTING
PUBLISHED
Meanwhile I was still laboring with various drafts of
various chapters, hoping to get a final version ready for
print.
But the constant evolutions of ideas and changes in
terminology did not help. Nor did the changes in Japan
help.
By the late eighties Japan was seen by many as a model for
the rest of us – Japan As Number One. Pointing out
Japan’s ‘tribal’ faults flew in the face
of that conventional wisdom.
The trade frictions then led others to see Japan as some
kind of sinister ‘system’ seeking to drive its
economic partners into disaster. Once again, my ideas about
Japan as a rather sloppily emotional and sometimes
disorganized society did not match the conventional wisdom.
To counter or balance these distorted images I rushed off
various articles for various magazines. None had much
impact, though I am rather proud on one effort for the
Amagi conference, later published in two parts in the Japan
Times (See website).
Using the curve of progress, it allowed me both to explain
Japan’s progress to date, and predict its later
troubles.
MORE
JAPANESE PUBLICATIONS
I also rather foolishly answered several requests from
Japanese publishers for books, only to realise a strange
aspect of Japanese publishing.
For most publishers the effort to promote a book in
Japan’s over-published society is too expensive and
risky.
So they aim to make most of their money with very limited
sales – 5,000 to 10,000, mainly to the author, his
friends and the few readers or libraries attracted by one
or two small ads run in the national newspapers.
(A very civilized aspect of Japanese newspapers is the
willingness to run book ads in narrow columns at the bottom
of their front pages.
(They see as both a public service, and as a form of news
Then if for some reason – a good review mainly or
catching the mood of the moment (as I had done with the
Japanese Tribe book) the book takes off and the publishers
see themselves as jackpot winners entitled to keep the
prize. It is one reason, and probably a good one, for their
strange attitude to royalty payments.
The publishers provide a certain amount up front –
say one million yen – to authors and leave it at
that. It is rare to get any followup.
That at least was my experience with the three or four
publishers I was involved with at the time. Needless to
say, one million yen or less is little reward for putting
out a book, especially in my case where there was also the
very laborious work of checking and correcting the
translation as well.
Even the best translators make mistakes, sometimes quite
serious. (In one case even the title was wrong – the
Haldeman book on the Nixon era “the Ends of
Power” had ‘ends’ translated as
‘finality’ rather than ‘means’).
In 1990, at the peak of the bubble economy, I worked hard
on a manuscript for Kodansha entitled “Gokai sareru
Nihonjin” (the Misunderstood Japanese), Writing and
correcting the Japanese translation took almost a year. I
had included a lot of new ideas and research.
In particular, I had pointed out the absurdity of the then
current land and share booms, and forecast their collapse.
But in the go-go mood at the time, Japan was not ready for
such warnings.
Kodansha did almost nothing to promote the book. Limited
sales meant few would know or remember later.
Trying to be a prophet ahead of the times is a thankless
profession.
I was to suffer quite a few other setbacks, even if the
lecture circuit did give me more freedom to indulge in the
prophecy business than most.
Increasingly I began to think about another business.
Instead of prophecy it would be property.
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